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COUNTRY Indochina

SUBJECT Mat-Tran-Thong-Nhat

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
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B-3 1. The Mat-Tran-Thong-Nhat is a consolidation of the Tan-Dan-Chu-Dang (SO-6748, SO-15603) and the Dai-Viet-Quoc-Dan-Dang (SO-14868a) and possibly some lesser organizations. The Tan-Dan-Chu-Dang (TDCD) is strongly anti-French and anti-Communist and is a staunch advocate of complete independence for Viet Nam. It has been a small, more or less underground organization which, lacking in mass support, has some able leaders and is well financed. In policy the TDCD feels that it is necessary for the Indochinese Independence Movement to depend upon its own resources rather than on foreign aid from any quarter. The Dai-Viet-Quoc-Dan-Dang, on the other hand, has been more or less oriented towards China, copying its policies and statutes from the Chinese KMT of Sun-Yat-Sen. ~~Comment.~~ This newly formed organization should not be confused with: (a) a consolidated front having exactly the same name which represented, in 1936-37, a temporary collaboration between the Trotskyists and the Stalinists; or (b) the somewhat similarly named Mat-Tran-Thong -Nhat-Quoc-Gia-Lien-Hiep (Nationalist Union Front) founded in Canton in 1947 under the auspices of Nguyen Tuong Tam.)

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B-3 2. It is possible that a certain part of the Mat-Tran-Thong-Nhat (MTN) will seek to infiltrate into the Viet Minh by outwardly announcing public support of the Viet Minh. This possible move would be based on two considerations: (a) resistance against the French is the prime necessity and the Viet Minh controls nearly the entire resistance movements; and (b) as purely military means can never dislodge the Communists from Indochina, it is therefore necessary to borrow a Communist technique and "bore from within".

B-3 3. On June 30, 1948 the MTN issued a policy text which announced a sort of tentative adherence to the Viet Minh for the purpose of dislodging the French from Indochina. The last paragraph of this announcement stated:

"We think it necessary to clarify our attitude when we say: 'We must defend the Ho-Chi-Minh Government against the attacks of the French colonialists, the Bao Dai movement, and the Xuan Government'. We mean that we must defend it according to the principles of the United Front. We will fight side by side with the Viet Minh against our common enemy, but we will never change our political conceptions toward the Viet Minh."

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4.

It is impossible at present to estimate the degree of importance of the collaboration which may take place between the MTTN and the Viet Minh or its possible consequences. In seeking to evaluate the situation the following three possibilities must be taken into consideration.

- a. The MTTN may collaborate sincerely and completely with the Viet Minh.
  - b. The MTTN may have an understanding with the Phuc Quoc (SO-16929) and will sooner or later abandon its compromise policy with the Viet Minh and come out openly for Quang De.
  - c. The MTTN may have or will have an understanding with the Phuc Quoc and will collaborate with the Viet Minh only against the French. At the same time it will try to undermine Communist influence in the Viet Minh and perhaps ultimately even attempt to gain control of the Viet Minh.
5. There are two factors in favor of possibility "a": first, as long as the Viet Minh controls most of the Vietnamese resistance forces it is the obvious rallying point for all anti-French activity; second, it must be noted that the MTTN is actually in Indochina and not (as is the Phuc Quoc) in a foreign country and is consequently much more under the physical control of the Viet Minh. Against this possibility it should be noted that the MTTN is a party which has never been a component of the Viet Minh and that sentimentally, politically, and militarily there appears to be a real opportunity for any sufficiently strong organization that is both anti-French and anti-Stalinist. If the MTTN collaborates sincerely with the Viet Minh it will inevitably lose its identity. The known tendencies of the most capable MTTN leaders are anti-Stalinist.
6. In favor of possibility "b" it may be noted that the general tendency of the MTTN is identical to that of the Phuc Quoc (anti-French, anti-Communist). In a sense the two groups are complementary; the MTTN has an organization in Indochina and the Phuc Quoc has useful foreign contacts. Against this possibility there are two factors of relatively minor importance: first, the strong pro-Chinese orientation of the Phuc Quoc as against the xenophobia of at least a section of the MTTN; second, the royalist tendencies of the Phuc Quoc as contrasted with the upper middle-class interests of the MTTN. A third factor of greater importance is the fact that the MTTN has not yet a sufficiently solid backing (popular or military) in Indochina to enable it to stand up openly against the Viet Minh without courting disaster.
7. The following basic factors should be noted in connection with possibility "c". The Phuc Quoc has considerable strength abroad and this strength would be useful to the MTTN, particularly for internal propaganda purposes. The capacities of the leaders of the MTTN and the Phuc Quoc are to some extent mutually complementary rather than competitive. Collaboration between the MTTN and the Phuc Quoc would tend to increase the influence of the leaders of both groups. The whole tenor of MTTN propaganda indicates the impossibility of sincere and complete collaboration with the Viet Minh.

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In connection with the possibility of a serious attempt by the MTN to infiltrate and eventually gain control of the Viet Minh, it should be noted that one or more persons who are secretly members of the MTN are at the same time occupying positions in the Viet Nam Government and are important in the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party, created as a puppet of the Indochinese Communist Party in order to swell the ranks of the Viet Minh Front, has exhibited some signs of breaking away from the Communists and achieving some measure of independence. The personnel of the Democratic Party have certain common material interests and certain spiritual affinities with the TDGD.

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